Global warming is widely considered to be one of the most serious environmental problems for current and future generations. Moreover, the apparent failure of the Kyoto Protocol to effect a meaningful reduction in greenhouse gas emissions has increased the importance of economic research into new ways to control global warming. In this exhaustive study, the authors break new ground by integrating cutting edge insights on global warming from three different perspectives: game theory, cost-effectiveness analysis and public choice. For each perspective the authors provide an overview of important results, discuss the theoretical consistency of the models and assumptions, highlight the practical problems which are not yet captured by theory and explore the different applications to the various problems encountered in global warming. They demonstrate how each perspective has its own merits and weaknesses, and advocate an integrated approach as the best way forward. They also propose a research agenda for the future which encompasses the three methods to create a powerful tool for the analysis and resolution of global pollution problems. Surveying a large amount of literature and providing plentiful examples of potential applications, this extensive book combines three branches of economic research on global warming into one accessible volume. It will be widely read by students and scholars in environmental courses, environmental and resource economists, and those working in governmental and non-governmental organisations concerned with international environmental problems.

Key environmental issues, such as biodiversity and climate change, have in recent years become more pressing than ever. Where the critical papers in the early 1990s explained the difficulties of cooperation in tackling transboundary environmental problems, later works have analyzed the various alternatives, and increased our understanding of various institutional designs and negotiation protocols' impact on the success of cooperation. This collection brings together the most important articles on the game theoretic analysis of international environmental cooperation to both confront the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to this, and demonstrate the diversity of methods used to analyze international environmental agreements.

Since there is no supranational institution which can enforce international environmental agreements (IEAs), international cooperation proves difficult in practice. Global emissions exhibit negative externalities in countries other than that of their origin and hence there is a high interdependence between countries, and strategic considerations play an important role. Game theory analyses the interaction between agents and formulates hypotheses about their behavior and the final outcomes in games. Hence, international environmental problems are particularly suited for analysis by this method. The book investigates various strategies to provide countries with an incentive to accede, agree and comply to an international environmental agreement (IEA). Finus shows that by integrating real world restrictions into a model, game theory is a powerful tool for explaining the divergence between 'first-best' policy recommendations and 'second-best' designs of actual IEAs. For instance he explains why (inefficient) uniform emission reduction quotas have played such a prominent role in past IEAs despite economists' recommendations for the use of (efficient) market-based instruments as for example emission targets and permits. Moreover, it is stated, that a single, global IEA on climate is not necessarily the best strategy and small coalitions may enjoy a higher stability and may achieve more. This book will be of great interest to scholars, researchers and lecturers in the fields of international environmental economics, game theory and international relations.